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DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN THE AIRLINE




The objective of this article is to merge the growing phenome-
non of distributed ledger technology with the airline industry.
This article attempts to attain its objective by succinctly clarify-
ing what distributed ledger technology truly is without explain-
ing the minutest of its details. Further, this article seeks to
achieve its objective by suggesting potential manners in which
this technology could apply to the airline industry; this is an en-
deavour that, so far, does not seem to have been undertaken in
a strict academic sense. Lastly, this article strives to link these
potential applications to the empire of the law by shedding light
on the legal implications that could arise from them.
By attempting to achieve its objective in the manner laid
down above, this article intends to both generate a discussion on
the applicability of distributed ledger technology to the airline
industry and encourage an influx of deeper studies on this inno-
vative theme by lawyers, economists, and engineers alike.
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS, the airline industry hasevolved significantly. This evolution has resulted from a
range of phenomena that have affected its commercial sur-
roundings—phenomena such as the rise and proliferation of
* The author is a Pro Bono Legal Assistant at the UN International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. The author obtained an LLM (Cum Laude) in
Advanced Studies in Air and Space Law, International Institute of Air and Space
Law, Leiden University (2016–2017).
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low-cost carriers, the spread of terrorism, the tensing of geopoli-
tics, and the sporadic occurrence of natural calamities.1
Notwithstanding this spectrum of catalytic events, aviation has
remained a financial stronghold. Evidence of this prowess stems
from both its total global economic impact, which in the year
2014 rested at a comfortable 2.7 trillion U.S. dollars, and its
healthy clientele, which in the year 2015 was composed of 3.6
billion passengers and 51.2 million tons of freight.2
Although the robustness of these figures certainly signifies an
industrial strength of great proportions, the next thirty years of
the airline industry are, however, forecast to be more turbulent
than the former, particularly “as a new wave of technological . . .
innovation unfurls.”3 One such innovation, it is contended, is
that of distributed ledger technology, and against this backdrop
this article seeks to determine how this technology can apply to
the airline industry and what its effects could be from a legal
perspective.
Since this article is seemingly the first of its kind in trying to
combine the relative novelty of distributed ledger technology to
the airline industry, it begins its first section by concisely clarify-
ing the technology involved. In its second section it then pro-
ceeds by conducting a brief analysis of the structure of the
airline industry and by exploring the possible ways in which the
technology could apply thereto. This article draws the discussion
to a close in its third section by demarcating the legal implica-
tions that could arise from the proposed applications of the
technology to the industry, especially in terms of the legal archi-
tecture of the European Union (EU).
With regard to the methodology applied it seems necessary to
indicate that, when carrying out the research and structuring
the arguments, considerable effort was made to find an equita-
ble balance between the more authoritative sources employed in
“traditional” jurisprudential papers—sources such as
monographs, journal articles, case law, and the law itself—and
the more authoritative sources employed in “contemporary”
1 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N & SCH. OF INT’L FUTURES, Future of the Airline Industry
2035, 1, 5 (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/iata-future-
airline-industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/23DM-H74N].




3 See Future of the Airline Industry 2035, supra note 1.
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ones—such as electronic news reports, studies by intergovern-
mental organisations, and reports by law firms and financial in-
stitutions. These sources, it must be conclusively added, were
reinforced as much as possible with quantitative and statistical
figures found in various studies and analyses.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MISUNDERSTOOD
Upon reading or hearing the word “blockchain,” images of
virtual currencies and vast riches instinctively race through the
mind as if they were synonymous with this particular unit of lan-
guage. Yet blockchain is much more than just these mental mi-
rages. Suffice it to say, in order to elucidate this point better,
that blockchain and “Bitcoin” are often used interchangeably
and incorrectly so: although the two are strongly associated, the
former is merely the technology through which the latter
functions.4
Bitcoin is a virtual currency that provides its own unit of ac-
count and payment systems, allowing for peer-to-peer (person-
to-person) transactions without central clearing houses and cen-
tral banks.5 Accordingly, Bitcoin is not saved in a file in a spe-
cific place, but it is “represented by transactions recorded in a
blockchain”: “a global . . . ledger, which leverages the resources
of a [vast] peer-to-peer . . . network to verify and approve each
. . . transaction.”6
Defined in a more methodical fashion, blockchain is a ledger
with three central elements: (1) it is distributed, in that it runs
on computers worldwide; (2) it is public, in that, since it resides
on the network, anyone can view it at any time; and (3) it is
encrypted, in that it uses heavy-duty encryption, involving long
numbers in the forms of “public” and “private” keys,7 to main-
tain virtual security.
4 Fiammetta S. Piazza, Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance
Tools: Strengths and Weaknesses, 5 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 262, 274 (2017).
5 Christine Lagarde, Central Banking and Fintech—A Brave New World?, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/
2017/09/28/sp092917-central-banking-and-fintech-a-brave-new-world [https://
perma.cc/Z9N8-HHUF].
6 DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECH-
NOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 6
(2016).
7 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 6, at 7. The public and private keys are
similar to a two-key system used to access a safety deposit box. The public key is a
long number available publicly and published by the private key owner, and any-
one who would like to send the publisher an encrypted message can do so by
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From this terminological dissection it is thus possible to draw
that, while Bitcoin is a “digital money ecosystem,”8 “blockchain
is an open, distributed ledger that can record transactions be-
tween two parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent
way,”9 with the “block” serving as the container of a short se-
quence of transactions,10 and the “chain” resulting from all the
blocks being stored in a certain order.11
At this juncture, it is to be further elucidated that, as with
blockchain and Bitcoin, the terms blockchain and distributed
ledger are erroneously interchanged.12 For while the former is
implicitly the latter, the latter is not implicitly the former. In-
deed, a distributed ledger is a digital record “shared instantane-
ously across a [public or private] network of participants,” with
the record being held by each network user—or node—who
must all agree on it, and with “each copy [of the record being]
updated with new information simultaneously.”13
Consequently, in light of the fact that a distributed ledger is a
digital record shared across a public or private network, it can
be deduced that blockchain, as a solely public ledger, is but one
breed of this technology.14 In this sense, while blockchain is nec-
essarily a distributed ledger, a distributed ledger is not necessa-
rily blockchain.
In fact, while blockchain is one breed of distributed ledger
technology, it is not the only breed thereof, with another such
type being “non-blockchain.” Non-blockchain is a private distrib-
using the published public key. The private key is a randomly generated, long
number which is kept secret and held privately by the users, and its function is to
decrypt the encrypted messages received. IMRAN BASHIR, MASTERING BLOCKCHAIN:
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER, TECHNOLOGY, DECENTRALIZATION AND SMART CONTRACTS
EXPLAINED 80–81 (2017).
8 ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: PROGRAMMING THE OPEN
BLOCKCHAIN 1 (2d ed. 2017).
9 Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/X675-DUGF].
10 Bjo¨rn Tackmann, Secure Event Tickets on a Blockchain, in DATA PRIVACY MAN-
AGEMENT, CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 437, 438 (J. Garcia
Alfaro et al. eds., 2017).
11 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks
of Blockchain, 52 UNIV. N.S.W. L. RES. SERIES 1, 11 (2017).
12 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC. & LINKLATERS, WHITEPAPER: SMART




14 Piazza, supra note 4.
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uted ledger, which is being designed and created to address the
needs of areas like the financial services industry wherein it is
not suitable for all transactions to be public.15
Setting this dichotomy in distributed ledgers aside, the crux
of the underlying technology is that it allows for a system
wherein, instead of having several competing sets of records that
need to be continuously reconciled, there exists only one such
set of records maintained on multiple interconnected nodes,
which must reach consensus on that set.16
Still further, blockchain in particular has the potential to
render third-party intermediaries and their incumbent costs re-
dundant,17 for these intermediaries subsist in the “centralized”
and “replicated” ledger systems18 where multiple repositories
house data and continuously duplicate, update, and reconcile it,
thereby leading to the incurring of “extra frictional costs.”19
To this end, blockchain holds “profound implications for
many institutions,” and its applications are so vast that “[it] can
be programmed to record virtually everything of value and im-
portance to humankind: birth and death certificates, marriage
licenses, deeds and titles of ownership, educational degrees, fi-
nancial accounts, medical procedures, insurance claims, votes,
15 See BAKER MCKENZIE & R3, BLOCKCHAINS AND LAWS. ARE THEY COMPATIBLE?
5–7 (July 2017), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/expertise/fig/
br_fig_blockchainsandlaws_jul17.pdf?la=en.
16 See WHITEPAPER: SMART CONTRACTS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER – A LEGAL PER-
SPECTIVE, supra note 12.
17 See Christian Catalini, How Blockchain Technology Will Impact the Digital Econ-
omy, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-
law-blog/blog/2017/04/how-blockchain-technology-will-impact-digital-economy
[https://perma.cc/2GR7-6HUQ].
18 Peter Evans-Greenwood et al., Bitcoin, Blockchain & Distributed Ledgers: Caught
Between Promise and Reality, DELOITTE AUSTRALIA 1, 12 (Mar. 2016), https://www2
.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/Images/infographics/au-deloitte-tech
nology-bitcoin-blockchain-distributed-ledgers-180416.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G9SJ-QALS]. In centralized and replicated ledger systems, ledgers are updated
and maintained by a central authority with whom other actors must communi-
cate in order to submit records for inclusion in the ledgers. Id. The difference
between these two systems is that, in the centralized system the actors must travel
to the central authority if they want to consult records, whereas in the replicated
system the “actors can obtain a copy of the ledger if they want to consult it.” Id. In
both cases, however, the central authority ensures ledger identity and integrity by
restricting access to it. Id.
19 ROGER MAULL ET AL., Distributed Ledger Technology: Applications and Implica-
tions, in STRATEGIC CHANGE 481, 485 (2017).
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provenance of food, and anything else that can be expressed in
code.”20
In conclusion, while distributed ledger technology and its de-
rivatives such as blockchain are portrayed as tools to make
money, in truth they are not solely money-making tools; rather,
they are a stepping stone to a new world.
III. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS IN THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The airline industry has a life of its own. Similar to many
other living things, this industry is composed of numerous dis-
tinct organs interlinked into one seamless body. At the epicen-
tre of this body lie the air carriers: the pounding heart of the
industry. Above and below them lie two separate networks of
indispensable actors: the veins and arteries that respectively
transport blood to and from the heart.
On the one hand, the network of actors lying above the air
carriers—the veins transporting blood to the heart—includes,
inter alia, aircraft and aircraft component manufacturers, les-
sors, infrastructure providers such as airports, and service prov-
iders such as insurers.21 On the other hand, the network of
actors lying below the air carriers—the arteries transporting
blood from the heart—includes, inter alia, freight forwarders,
global distribution systems (GDSs), and online travel agencies
(OTAs).22
By so likening the airline industry to a living organism, it is
possible to extrapolate two correlative facts. First, it is possible to
extrapolate that the industry clearly functions in a complex
manner which is oft-overlooked. Second, it is possible to extra-
polate that, because of this functional complexity, the exchange
of data within the industry “is not always smooth.”23
Indeed, in the background a web of intricate and endless data
reconciliation is perpetually being weaved, because all the actors
involved are constantly collecting, storing, and sharing informa-
tion among each other, with the air carriers alone sharing data
20 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 6, at 7–8.
21 Michael W. Threteway & Kate Markhvida, The Aviation Value Chain: Economic
Returns and Policy Issues, 16 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 3, 5 (2014).
22 Id.
23 Beyond the Buzz: The Potential of Blockchain Technology for Airlines, ACCENTURE
CONSULTING (2017), https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-potential-block
chain-technology-for-airlines [https://perma.cc/8K44-496L].
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even internally as it is stored in “isolated systems ranging from
passenger service to crew management.”24
Recalling at this point that a distributed ledger is a digital re-
cord of data “shared instantaneously across a network of partici-
pants,”25 it follows without much difficulty that distributed
ledger technology has the potential to apply like clockwork in
an industry such as the one under consideration where multiple
records of data are shared among and within a network of multi-
ple actors. The concomitant question, therefore, is “how can it
apply?”
A. RATIONAL APPLICATION OF DISTRIBUTED
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY
In determining how distributed ledger technology can apply
in the airline industry, it is suitable to depart from a succinct
proposition. This proposition, as shall be seen, quite simply sug-
gests that the industry ought to capitalize on the dichotomy of
distributed ledger technology and apply both blockchain and
non-blockchain ledgers.
As explained above, the airline industry has two major net-
works: (1) the network between the air carriers and the actors
that distribute passengers and cargo, i.e. the network between
the heart and the arteries; and (2) the network between the air
carriers and the actors that provide the infrastructure, services,
and aircraft or aircraft components, i.e. the network between
the heart and the veins.
The difference between these two networks is that while the
former “arterial network” has a predominantly public nature, the
latter “venous network” has a predominantly private one. In
other words, while the arterial network entails air carriers pro-
viding a product to the public, albeit through third party in-
termediaries such as GDSs and OTAs, the venous network
entails air carriers being provided with a product by the private
sector.
Following this line of thought, the airline industry could apply
distributed ledger technology in a manner that reflects this rudi-
mentary difference between its two networks: on the one hand,
the industry could apply a public distributed ledger—
blockchain—to its arterial network between the air carriers and
24 Id.
25 WHITEPAPER: SMART CONTRACTS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER – A LEGAL PER-
SPECTIVE, supra note 12.
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the public, and on the other, it could apply a private distributed
ledger—non-blockchain—to its venous network between the air
carriers and the private industry.
Based on this proposition, there are two potential respects in
which the airline industry could apply both blockchain and non-
blockchain.
B. APPLYING BLOCKCHAIN: A CASE FOR E-TICKETS
Starting with blockchain, the most critical respect in which it
could apply is that of “e-tickets” (electronic tickets), which, ac-
cording to the International Air Transportation Association
(IATA), constituted 96.5% of all tickets issued worldwide by the
year 2008.26
An e-ticket can be formally defined as (i) “the [i]tinerary [or]
[r]eceipt issued by or on behalf of the [air] [c]arrier”; (ii) “the
electronic coupons”; and (iii) “if applicable, a boarding docu-
ment.”27 Notwithstanding this structural decomposition of the
term, an e-ticket is but a database entry—data that, instead of
being printed on a paper, is “dematerialized, stored in and
called up from a massive database.”28
In light of the fact that e-tickets are essentially dematerialized
data, and recalling that blockchain, as a breed of distributed
ledgers, is nothing more than a digital record of data shared
across a network, it is possible to conclude that blockchain tech-
nology can be quite seamlessly fused with e-tickets.
This fusion can be achieved by “tokenizing” the e-tickets.29
This means converting the rights to the ticket—the physical as-
set—into a “token,”30 which is the digital equivalent of the as-
set.31 To this end it must be added that, because tokens are
themselves digital, when one buys a token one is effectively buy-
ing a private key (the long number mentioned previously) that
26 Peter Belobaba et al., Information Technology in Airline Operations, Distribution
and Passenger Processing, in THE GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 461, 481 (2d ed. 2016).
27 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, TICKETING HANDBOOK 1 (39th ed. 2007).
28 Beyond the Buzz: The Potential of Blockchain Technology for Airlines, supra note 23.
29 Id.
30 Addison Cameron-Huff, How Tokenization is Putting Real-World Assets on
Blockchain, NASDAQ (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/how-tokeni
zation-is-putting-real-world-assets-on-blockchains-cm767952 [https://perma.cc/
6VYG-EYG8].
31 See Preethi Kasireddy, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Blockchain, Tokens, ICOs: Why Should
Anyone Care?, HACKERNOON (July 5, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/bitcoin-
ethereum-blockchain-tokens-icos-why-should-anyone-care-890b868cec06[https://
perma.cc/68GE-ZKQP].
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grants access to the token and therefore to the underlying as-
set,32 ergo the ticket.
Having submitted how this fusion could be carried out, it is
possible to submit what this fusion would lead to. To this end, it
is necessary to reiterate the point that blockchain has the poten-
tial to render third-party intermediaries and their incumbent
costs redundant,33 because these intermediaries subsist in the
centralized and replicated ledger systems, which are the diamet-
rical opposites of the distributed ledger system that is
blockchain.
On the ground of this submission it can be sensibly posited
that, if the air carriers were to fuse blockchain with e-tickets,
they could lead third-party intermediaries such as GDSs and
OTAs to become less vital over time. In practice this would
mean that the air carriers could lower transaction costs,34
thereby making the most of blockchain, and thus sell tickets at
lower prices.
Over and above, the air carriers could try to attract the $200
billion in additional revenue—or parts thereof—that is pro-
jected to migrate to the online channels by the year 2021.35 This
is all while breaking away from their current subservient posi-
tion wherein they have little choice but to accept the terms of
these third-party intermediaries, which at times can be of an
anti-competitive nature as witnessed in US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre
Holdings Corp.36
As innovative as this idea of fusing e-tickets with blockchain
might sound, some actors of the industry have already begun to
explore it. In fact, Swiss start-up Winding Tree has teamed up
with Air New Zealand and Lufthansa to explore blockchain-
32 VIKRAM DHILLON ET AL., BLOCKCHAIN ENABLED APPLICATIONS: UNDERSTAND
THE BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM AND HOW TO MAKE IT WORK FOR YOU 81 (2017).
33 See Catalini, supra note 17.
34 Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65
DUKE L.J. 569, 572 (2015).
35 Henry H. Harteveldt, The Future of Airline Distribution: 2016–2021, INT’L AIR
TRANSP. ASS’N 1, 36 (2016), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/airline-distribution/
ndc/Documents/ndc-future-airline-distribution-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C43X-6N78].
36 See 105 F. Supp. 3d 265 (S.D.N.Y 2017). In this case, Sabre violated antitrust
law as it forced US Airways to accept a contract on its terms, or risk being cut off
from its network. See Nate Raymond, American Airlines Wins $15 Million in Antitrust
Case Against Sabre, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
american-airline-sabre/american-airlines-wins-15-million-in-antitrust-case-against-
sabre-idUSKBN1492K4 [https://perma.cc/LD55-2AT5].
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based applications that could help them improve things like
their booking service, thereby allowing both their customers to
benefit from reduced transactional costs, and themselves to util-
ize the swift sharing of information.37
More audaciously, toward the end of July 2017, S7 Airlines
started selling tickets through blockchain.38 This move was sup-
ported by the largest private financial institution of Russia, Alfa-
Bank, at the very least because “[t]he system of payments on the
basis of the [blockchain] ensures the receipt of proceeds from
sales, minus the commission of the agent immediately after the
issuance of the ticket.”39
Fusing e-tickets with blockchain, in sum, has both the poten-
tial to make the arterial network between the airlines and the
public more lucrative and the potential to put it on an even
keel.
C. APPLYING NON-BLOCKCHAIN: A CASE FOR MAINTENANCE
Non-blockchain, on the other hand, is most applicable to air-
craft maintenance. A study carried out by the Maintenance Cost
Task Force of IATA demonstrated that global maintenance, re-
pair, and overhaul spending was valued at $62.1 billion in the
year 2014.40
According to the same study, developing trends and technolo-
gies in maintenance such as aircraft health monitoring systems
and additive manufacturing (3-D printing) are estimated to de-
crease maintenance, repair, and overhaul spending by
15–20%.41 This translates to a decrease of around $9.3–12.4 bil-
lion. This estimated decrease in spending could be pushed fur-
ther down with the application of non-blockchain to
maintenance.
37 See Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Air New Zealand, Swiss Travel Platform Winding




38 Tom Ward, An Airline Just Started Using an Ethereum Blockchain to Issue Tickets,
FUTURISM (July 26, 2017), https://futurism.com/an-airline-just-started-using-ethe
reum-blockchain-to-issue-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/VVH4-QJJU].
39 Vladislav Noviiy, Flights Pay for the Block, KOMMERSANT (July 27, 2017), https:/
/www.kommersant.ru/doc/3365852.
40 This excludes overhead. INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N MAINTENANCE COST TASK
FORCE, AIRLINE MAINTENANCE COST EXECUTIVE COMMENTARY 14 (Dec. 2015).
41 Id. at 15.
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Modern aircraft consist of millions of components, with the
lifecycle of each involving many actors—from manufacturer to
transporter and from transporter to operator—all with a mainte-
nance system of their own.42 Due to this individuality, the sys-
tems are disparate, and because of this disparity between
systems, the entire lifecycle of a specific component does not
easily yield a singular string of coherent data.43
In addition, because the relevant data is maintained either on
computerized records or on paper, synchronizing such comput-
erized record systems (which can be incomplete), or such
paperwork—“job cards with ‘dirty finger prints’”—is not a
smooth process and thus can introduce unwanted delays.44 In
this light, it is apparent that a link needs to be created between
the various actors dealing with an aircraft component, such as
between the repair organization and the maintenance
organization.45
Clearly, from this exposition it emanates that the industry is
yearning for non-blockchain to apply to maintenance as it could
provide this much-needed link between the various actors in-
volved. Considering that maintenance is rich in the sharing of
data among a variety of actors, and considering that non-
blockchain, as a breed of distributed ledger technology, is a digi-
tal record of data shared across a network, by combining the two
together all the actors involved in maintenance could share one
consolidated record for each aircraft component.
Translated into practical terms, the manufacturer would be-
gin by creating a non-blockchain for a specific component, and
all other actors would build upon that foundation by adding
blocks whenever they come into contact with the component.46
For instance, the distributor would add a block when a compo-
nent is delivered from one location to another, and the opera-
tor would add a block with “the number of flight hours that the
[component] has undergone.”47
42 See Bas de Vos, Blockchain for Aviation Asset Management, FARNBOROUGH INT’L
NEWS NET. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.wearefinn.com/topics/posts/block
chain-for-aviation-asset-management/ [https://perma.cc/4DMQ-SVYD].
43 Id.
44 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, BEST PRACTICES FOR COMPONENT MAINTENANCE
COST MANAGEMENT 12 (2d ed. 2015).
45 Id. at 15.
46 de Vos, supra note 42.
47 Id.
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Although this idea of combining maintenance with non-
blockchain might seem forward-looking, as with the case of e-
tickets and blockchain, some actors in the industry have already
begun exploring it. Indeed, Boeing has designed a network that,
by “integrat[ing] customers, parts suppliers, and component
overhaul providers,” seeks to “deliver a flexible suite of services
supporting airline maintenance, repair, and overhaul
services.”48
While Boeing is mainly developing this network in order to
“[reduce] outages and unplanned maintenance,”49 Lufthansa is
exploring, through a similar initiative, how this type of technol-
ogy “can be used to increase transparency within flight mainte-
nance.”50 Furthermore, Air France-KLM has started evaluating
the potential of this type of technology becoming its “new digital
ledger for managing replacement parts on in-service
airplanes.”51
Air France-KLM even went to the extent of demonstrating
how this would work in practice: once a faulty aircraft compo-
nent was identified on a mock flight, an engineer was able to
acquire a replacement by creating a distributed ledger for that
piece.52 This ledger could be viewed by himself, the Air France-
KLM logistics and loan officers, and other engineers or techni-
cians responsible for obtaining the replacement part.53
All in all, applying non-blockchain to maintenance can lead
the venous network between the airlines and the private sector
to enjoy a wholly “verifiable, traceable and trustworthy history of
the . . . lifecycle” of a component, leading to improved data
48 Jeff Liu & Paul Brody, Is Collaboration the New Innovation?, HARVARD BUS. REV.
1, 4 (Nov. 2016), https://hbr.org/resources/pdfs/comm/ey/IsCollaboration
TheNewInnovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/L58E-NMAZ].
49 Carlo Gutierrez, Boeing Improves Operations with Blockchain and the Internet of
Things, ALTOROS (May 24, 2017), https://www.altoros.com/blog/boeing-im-
proves-operations-with-blockchain-and-the-internet-of-things/ [https://perma
.cc/S37R-ES7D] (quoting Robert Rencher, Senior Systems Engineer, Boeing).
50 Woodrow Bellamy III, IOT, Blockchain Proposed to Improve Aircraft Maintenance
Process, AVIONICS (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.aviationtoday.com/2017/01/13/
iot-blockchain-proposed-to-improve-aircraft-maintenance-process/ [https://per
ma.cc/Q9D4-BK49].
51 Woodrow Bellamy III, Air France KLM is Evaluating MRO Potential for
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quality, more accurate maintenance history, cheaper compli-
ance and, in turn, increased airworthiness.54
IV. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
Having assessed the potential applications of blockchain and
non-blockchain within the airline industry, a subsequent analysis
of the potential legal implications resulting therefrom can be
undertaken.
This analysis shall correspond to the proposition that
blockchain and non-blockchain can be both applied to the air-
line industry. Thus, the analysis begins with the legal implica-
tions resulting from the application of blockchain to the arterial
network of the industry, then the analysis shifts to the legal im-
plications resulting from the application of non-blockchain to
the venous network.
A. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN
With regard to blockchain it has been suggested that a princi-
pal respect in which it could apply is that of e-tickets, done by
converting the rights to an e-ticket into a “token” that in turn
becomes the digital equivalent of the e-ticket.
This application could potentially result in a legal implication
concerning data protection, most notably within the context of
the EU. The EU has adopted the General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) to ensure a consistent and high level of protec-
tion within its Member States of the rights and freedoms of
natural persons with regard to the processing of “personal
data,”55 which has become as valuable a resource as oil.56
54 de Vos, supra note 42.
55 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 1(2)
[hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation].
56 WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW ASSET
CLASS 5 (Jan. 2011), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalData
NewAsset_Report_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PQB-HWY8]. Personal data is
defined by the GDPR as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as
a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic,
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The GDPR applies to “the processing of personal data wholly
or partly by automated means and to the processing other than
by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing
system or are intended to form part of a filing system.”57 While
the crux of this sentence is rather straightforward, the trained
legal mind cannot help but question the meaning of certain key
terms employed in it, such as “processing” and “filing system.”
In satisfaction of this irrepressible inclination, it is to be ex-
plained that, while the “processing” of personal data is defined
as “any operation or . . . operations which is [or are] performed
on personal data . . . , whether or not by automated means, such
as collection, . . . storage, . . . or dissemination,”58 the “filing system”
of which the personal data forms part is defined as “any struc-
tured set of personal data which [is] accessible according to spe-
cific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a
functional or geographical basis.”59
With these definitions in place, it is possible to infer that the
application of blockchain to e-tickets falls under the GDPR’s
purview. This inference is rooted in the fact that the informa-
tion of the natural person divulged when buying an e-ticket
would be stored and shared across a distributed (“dispersed,” as
per the GDPR) network. In simple terms, the personal data of
the passenger will be processed by automated means and will
form part of a filing system.
Since the GDPR applies to data controllers and processors
both inside the EU60 and outside the EU, so long as the process-
ing activities of the latter relate to, inter alia, the offering of
goods or services to subjects within the EU,61 any air carrier that
applies blockchain to e-tickets in the EU would be binding itself
to comply with the provisions of the GDPR.
Among these provisions are a few that introduce liability, in
the form of fines, to data controllers and processors that in-
cultural or social identity of that natural person.” General Data Protection Regu-
lation, supra note 55, at art. 4(1).
57 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 55, art. 2(1).
58 Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added).
59 Id. art. 4(6) (emphasis added).
60 Id. art. 3(1).
61 Id. art. 3(2)(a); ALLEN & OVERY LLP, PREPARING FOR THE GENERAL DATA PRO-
TECTION REGULATION 5 (Jan. 2018), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollection
Documents/Radical%20changes%20to%20European%20data%20protection%
20legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSS9-ZZDL].
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fringe the GDPR.62 By way of example, the GDPR provides that
“those who are at fault for data protection violations can be
charged substantial fines,” which in certain circumstances can
be the higher of either “C= 20 million or 4 percent of an under-
taking’s total worldwide annual turnover in the preceding finan-
cial year.”63
To this end, attention ought to be drawn to the fact that these
fines can, however, be decreased, such as if the data controller
or processor had implemented technical and organizational
measures in compliance with the GDPR.64 Thus, those air carri-
ers deciding to apply blockchain to e-tickets would do well to
put in place clear policies and well-practiced procedures which
seek to ensure that one can react quickly to any data breach.65
In this light, therefore, it is evident that a legal implication
potentially resulting from the application of blockchain to e-
tickets relates not simply to data protection, but rather to the
liability accompanying it. This implication, however, is not the
only one that could potentially result from the application of
blockchain to e-tickets, since there could also potentially result
an implication related to competition (antitrust) law.
With regard to this potential implication of the applicability
of blockchain to e-tickets, reference can be made to the state-
ment of the European Securities and Markets Authority that
“[t]he shared and public features of [blockchain] could facili-
tate market manipulation and other unfair practices. In the ab-
sence of proper safeguards, some could unduly exploit the
information recorded in [blockchain] to front-run competitors
or manipulate prices.”66 Although this statement was made in
the context of the application of blockchain to securities, this
statement can be transposed to the application of blockchain to
e-tickets, especially in terms of the potential market and price
manipulation that could result from it.
62 PAUL VOIGT & AXEL VON DEN BUSSCHE, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION (GDPR): A PRACTICAL GUIDE 31 (2017).
63 W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data Protec-
tion Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. LAW. 221, 229–30
(2016); General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 55, arts. 83(5), 83(6).
64 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 55, art. 83(2)(d).
65 PREPARING FOR THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION, supra note 61,
at 9.
66 EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., REPORT: THE DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOL-
OGY APPLIED TO SECURITIES MARKETS 11–12 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.esma
.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/dlt_report_-_esma50-1121423017-285.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2QW-59J3].
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When analyzing cartel and collusion activity in the airline in-
dustry, a problem is that “the prevalence of information in the in-
dustry makes it fairly simple for airlines to match the prices and
output of competitors.”67 This problem could only intensify if
blockchain is applied to e-tickets, as the information in the in-
dustry will be not only prevalent but also organized on a digital
record that is shared across a network.
Consequently, the air carriers would be able to match the
prices and output of competitors far more easily than they do
today—even through “tacit collusion” whereby they would coor-
dinate their conduct without express communication, such as
through price signaling68—and this could in turn lead to a surge
in the number of cartels formed. To this end, the EU would be
particularly prone to such a surge taking place on its soil, for the
punishment imposed by the European Commission (EC) with
respect to cartels lacks a criminal law nature.69
In fact, although the fines imposed by the EC seek to dis-
incentivize the creation of cartels (not specific to the airline in-
dustry), they do not seem to serve as a sufficient disincentive
since, as demonstrated by a statistical study of the EC itself, from
the years 1990 to 1999 the Commission decided twenty cartel
cases, from the years 2000 to 2009 it decided more than sixty
cases, and from 2010 to November of 2017 it already decided
forty-eight cases.70
While it is very plausible that this increase in the number of
cartels corresponds with the growth of the internal market of
the EU and with the existence of a “leniency policy,”71 which
helps uncover such illegal activities, it is unquestionable that this
67 BIJAN VASIGH ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO AIR TRANSPORT ECONOMICS: FROM
THEORY TO APPLICATIONS 271 (2d ed. 2016) (emphasis added).
68 Id. In terms of this statement it is to be added that, the fact that two air
carriers have price fluctuations which match does not mean that they are defi-
nitely colluding, but it could mean that they are simply competing. Id.
69 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Imple-
mentation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty, 2002 O.J. (L 001); see Wouter P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition
Law the Answer?, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 1, 4 (2005).
70 EUROPEAN COMM’N, CARTEL STATISTICS § 1.10 (Mar. 21, 2018), http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ETE2-5T78]. Note that, in this study, the EC considered only those cartel cases
(which are not specific to the airline industry alone) where a fine was imposed.
71 See Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in
Cartel Cases, 2006 O.J. (C 298), as Amended by the Amendments to the Commis-
sion Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases,
2015 O.J. (C 256).
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increase in cartels demonstrates that undertakings are not suffi-
ciently deterred from forming cartels; rather, they are still quite
willing to do so.
Accordingly, the EU should strongly consider criminalizing
cartels similar to the United States where criminal enforcement
is a “cornerstone” of the “successful campaign” of the Depart-
ment of Justice against cartels72 and where criminalization of
cartel law infringements is adopted on the notion that imposi-
tion of a criminal sanction, such as that of imprisonment, serves
as a “strong disincentive for individuals to participate in . . .
cartel[s].”73
B. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NON-BLOCKCHAIN
With regard to non-blockchain it has been suggested that a
primary respect in which it could apply is that of maintenance
by serving as a link between the various actors involved that,
through this technology, share one consolidated record for each
aircraft component.
A legal implication that could potentially result from this ap-
plication of non-blockchain relates to product liability, particu-
larly in terms of the Product Liability Directive74 (PLD) of the
EU, which establishes the principle of liability without fault ap-
plicable to producers in the EU when a defective product causes
damage to a consumer.75
In so establishing this principle of liability, the PLD provides
several defenses that may exempt the producer from liability,
with one such defence requiring proof that “it is probable that
the defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time
when the product was put into circulation or that this defect
came into being afterwards.”76
In this regard, it is added that, although there have been
questions on what may amount to “put into circulation,” the
72 Peter Whelan, Legal Certainty and Cartel Criminalisation within the EU Member
States, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 677, 678 (2012).
73 Alexander Italianer, Fighting Cartels in Europe and the US: Different Systems,
Common Goals, EUROPEAN COMM’N 1, 2 (Oct. 9, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/speeches/text/sp2013_09_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/82MS-KF96].
74 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concern-
ing Liability for Defective Products 1985 O.J. (L210) [hereinafter Product Liabil-
ity Directive].
75 See O’Byrne v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd., 2006 E.C.R.1-1343; Sidhant Sharma,
Aviation Product Liability in the European Union, 15 AVIATION & SPACE J. 1, 4 (2016).
76 Product Liability Directive, supra note 74, art. 7(b).
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Court of Justice of the European Union (then the European
Court of Justice) has clarified that this term is to be interpreted
as meaning “when [the product] is taken out of the manufactur-
ing process operated by the producer and enters a marketing
process in the form in which it is offered to the public in order
to be used or consumed.”77
In this context, the implication resulting from the application
of non-blockchain to maintenance could be a positive one since,
if the producer were to create a non-blockchain for a specific
component and then all other actors were to build upon that
foundation by adding blocks whenever they came in contact
with the component, it would be possible to put a finger on the
precise moment when a defect in that component arose.
As a result (considering that the typical case in which this de-
fence may come into play is where it is claimed that the danger
stems from lack of repair or servicing or from subsequent tam-
pering of the product),78 through non-blockchain the producer
would be able to know exactly when the defect arose and
thereby prove with certainty, rather than with probability,
whether or not the defect that caused the damage existed at the
time when the product was put into circulation.
Finally, a further legal implication that could potentially arise
from the application of non-blockchain to maintenance is, once
again, related to competition law since, if by applying non-
blockchain to maintenance the various actors involved create a
de facto consortium, it could be argued that there exists a cartel
in the midst of it all.79
In this regard, it is once again opined that a surge in the num-
ber of cartels resulting from the application of non-blockchain
to maintenance could plague the EU, and while it is not neces-
sary to explain once more why such a surge could result, it can
be simply restated that the EU should strongly consider
criminalizing cartels in order to try and prevent this surge from
happening.
77 O’Byrne v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd., 2006 E.C.R.1-1343, ¶ 32.
78 C.J. MILLER & R.S. GOLDBERG, PRODUCT LIABILITY 486 (2d ed. 2004) (Note
that the authors speak of Section 4(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987
of the UK, which is the implementing provision of art. 7(b) of the PLD).
79 See Sue McLean, Blockchain: Key Legal and Regulatory Challenges with Distributed
Ledger Technology, COMPUTERWORLD UK (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.computer
worlduk.com/data/key-legal-regulatory-challenges-with-distributed-ledger-techno
logy-3638089/ [https://perma.cc/8Q77-357U].
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V. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to this discussion on the potential applications and
implications of distributed ledger technology, it is possible to
conclude that, overall, this technology can serve as a stimulant
to the airline industry. With regard to the applications, it is pro-
pounded that this technology offers the industry an opportunity
to become more streamlined, as well as an opportunity to de-
crease its break-even load factors. With regard to the implica-
tions, it is propounded that, although this technology does not
escape the grips of the law and does not bestow upon the indus-
try complete legal freedom, it can serve, at times, as undeniable
legal evidence and as a means of ensuring fair market
conditions.
Still further, it can be concluded that an investment in distrib-
uted ledger technology could benefit the airline industry in the
long-term for, ultimately, this technology can be compared to
“digital land” on which “digital buildings,” such as Bitcoin, are
erected. Accordingly, by investing in the land rather than the
buildings, the airline industry would be ensuring that, should
the buildings collapse, it would still be in a strategic position as
the land it would have invested in (i.e. the distributed ledger
technology) would still be well in place.
In this context, therefore, the airline industry could be a pre-
sent-day pioneer by increasing its research in and development
of the infrastructure of the world of tomorrow: distributed
ledger technology.
